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Abstract:
Purpose: This  paper  aims  to  develop  a  theoretical  framework  for  profit  allocation,  as  a
mechanism for aligning incentives, in collaborative supply chains.
Design/methodology/approach: The issue of  profit distribution is approached from a game-
theoretic  perspective.  We use  the  nucleolus  concept.  The framework  is  illustrated through a
numerical example based on the Beer Game scenario.
Findings: The nucleolus offers a powerful perspective to tackle this problem, as it takes into
consideration the  bargaining power of  the different  echelons.  We show that  this  framework
outperforms classical alternatives.
Research  limitations/implications: The  allocation  of  the  overall  supply  chain  profit  is
analyzed from a static perspective. Considering the dynamic nature of  the problem would be an
interesting next step. 
Practical implications: We provide evidence of  drawbacks derived from classical solutions to
the profit allocation problem. Real-world collaborative supply chains need of  robust mechanisms
like the one tackled in this work to align incentives from the various actors. 
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Originality/value: Adopting an efficient collaborative solution is a major challenge for supply
chains, since it is a wide and complex process that requires an appropriate scheme. Within this
framework, profit allocation is essential. 
Keywords: beer  distribution game,  game theory,  incentive  alignment,  profit  allocation,  supply  chain
collaboration
1. Introduction
In the current global business scene, a premium has been placed upon collaboration as a core source of
gaining competitive advantages in supply chains. The strategic importance of  supply chain collaboration has
turned this concept into a fruitful research area over the last two decades (Puche, Ponte, Costas, Pino &
de la Fuente, 2016). 
As a result, collaborative practices based on information sharing have been successfully implemented in real
supply chains, such as Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) (Wood, 1993), Vendor Managed Inventory
(VMI)  (Waller,  Johnson & Davis,  1999)  and Collaborative  Planning,  Forecasting  and Replenishment
(CPFR) (Fliedner, 2003). 
Nonetheless, information sharing (the access to private data in all partners’ systems) must be understood
as only one feature of  supply chain collaboration. In the same line as Simatupang and Sridharan (2005),
we define a feature as an area of  collaborative effort that has a positive impact on performance. These
authors also highlight process integration (which refers to the design of  an efficient supply chain that deliver
product to the customers at the right time) and decision synchronization (which includes both joint decision-
making mechanisms and the reallocation of  decisions rights in order to synchronize the planning and
execution levels) as key additional features within a successful collaborative scheme. In addition, the use
of  overall  performance  indicators  (a  systemic  scorecard,  that  is,  the  use  of  metrics  that  quantify  the
performance of  the supply chain as a whole) is indispensable to guide the collaborative efforts towards a
successful global optimization –in contrast to non-collaborative supply chains, which are based on local
optimization. 
In the analysis by Simatupang and Sridharan (2005), these four features (namely, information sharing,
process integration, decision synchronization, and systemic scorecard) have shown to be necessary but
not sufficient. A last feature emerges to make collaboration viable in the long term: incentive alignment. The
various supply chain nodes must be motivated to act in a manner consistent with the overall strategic
goals (Ponte, Costas, Puche, De la Fuente & Pino, 2016); otherwise, they may behave opportunistically
-1021-
Journal of  Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2084
and this situation would lead collaboration to failure (Fawcett,  McCarter,  Fawcett,  Webb & Magnan,
2015).
In this sense, supply chain collaboration can be understood as a  pyramid. Its competitive advantage is
based on process integration  (Level 2).  This integration, which should be guided through a systemic
scorecard, must be built on synchronized decisions and shared information, which can be understood as
the enablers (Level 1). The whole collaborative structure is supported by incentive alignment (Level 0):
the different supply chain actors cannot feel that they have anything to gain by deviating from the overall
strategy of  the system. This pyramidal notion, aimed at making viable and taking full advantage of  supply
chain collaboration, is illustrated by Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The pyramid of  supply chain collaboration, adapted from Simatupang and Sridharan (2005)
In general terms, incentive alignment refers to profit allocation (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2007). The
overall  profit  achieved  through  optimizing  globally  the  supply  chain  –which  (by  definition  of
collaboration) will be higher than the sum of  the individual profits achieved through local optimization–
must be distributed among the various participants. Simatupang and Sridharan (2008) points out that the
allocation must  be  based on two principles:  (1)  compensation fairness,  which refers  to an equitable
sharing;  and (2)  self-enforcing,  which  ensures  that  the  nodes  keep aligned with the  overall  goal  of
improving total profits. 
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Under these circumstances (and following the core concepts on supply chain collaboration introduced in
Section 1), this paper uses game-theoretic concepts to propose a robust framework for aligning incentives
in collaborative supply chains. Section 2 contains three stages. First, we present the nomenclature of  the
problem. Second, we define the conditions that the distribution of  the overall profit must verify. Third,
we  propose  the  allocation  of  the  overall  profit  among  the  various  supply  chain  nodes  through  a
mechanism based  on the  nucleolus  concept  (Schmeidler,  1969).  Hereinafter,  Section  3 illustrates  its
application by means of  a numerical example developed on the Beer Game supply chain, in which we
compare  several  solutions  for  profit  allocation.  Finally  (Section 4),  we conclude and we draw some
avenues for future work on this issue. 
2. A Game-Theoretic Framework for Allocating the Surplus
In  this  section,  we  first  describe  the  key  variables  involved  in  the  problem of  profit  allocation  in
collaborative supply chains as well as their mathematical notation based on cooperative game theory.
Secondly, we discuss three conditions that must be verified by viable profit  distributions. Finally,  we
propose a specific solution to this problem built on the nucleolus concept.
2.1. Mathematical Notation
Let N denote the set of  supply chain members; N = {1, …, n}, where n ≥ 2 refers to the number of
them. 
Let v(C ) be a characteristic function that assigns to each coalition C the net profit earned by its members
as a  result  of  their  joint  efforts.  In this  sense,  a coalition  C  represent several  nodes (C  N)  who
participate within the same collaborative solution. Hence, note that: (1) v(i ) represents the net profit that
obtains the node i by acting alone (i.e., when node i seeks local optimization); and (2) v(N) represents the
overall net profit obtained by the supply chain when all nodes participate in the collaborative process
(i.e., when they seek global optimization). As common in the literature on game theory, we will simplify
v({a, b, c})  to  v(abc) when we refer to the net profit obtained by the coalition  C = {a, b, c}  formed by
nodes a, b, and c. 
Regarding the net profit generated by the various coalitions that may arise in the supply chain, we assume
the following properties, which fit perfectly with the definition of  supply chain collaboration:
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1. Monotonicity, which means that enlarging a coalition within the supply chain always increases its the
net profit; i.e., v(C’ ) ≤ v(C ) C’  C.
2. Supperaditivity, which means that the net profit of  any coalition is larger than the sum of  smaller
coalitions within the previous one; i.e., v(C ) ≥ v(C’ ) + v(C’’ ) C’, C’’  C, C’ ∩ C’’ = Ø.
Note that the previous properties imply that the maximum net profit will be achieved in the supply chain
when all nodes involve in collaboration; i.e., v(N) = max {v(C )}.
2.2. Problem Statement and Conditions of  the Distribution
Under this scenario, the key question is how the overall net profit generated by each collaborative solution
must be distributed among among its constituent supply chain nodes. Let  x(i,  C ),  i   C  N, be the
decision variables in this problem. They refer to the net profit allocated to the supply chain actor i when
he/she collaborates within the coalition C. 
From this point on, we define those allocations that verify the following three necessary conditions as
viable profit allocations.
1. Efficiency, which means that the overall net profit generated by the coalition has been distributed
among all its members; i.e., v(C ) = Σi  C x(i, C ).
2. Individual rationality, which means that each node gets more by collaborating than what he/she
would get by acting alone; i.e., v(i ) < x(i, C) ∀ i.
3. Coalition rationality, which means that if  a new member incorporates to a specific coalition, the
former supply chain members get more than what they earned in the previous coalition; i.e.
v(C ∪ {i}) – x(i, C) > v(C). 
Note that individual rationality is an essential condition, as it means that the coalition has a positive
(financial) impact on every node involved in it. If  this condition is not verified, at least one node will have
a strong motive for breaking away from the coalition. Coalition rationality expresses a similar idea: if  it is
not verified, a group of  nodes will have a strong motivation for breaking away from the coalition and
create together an independent one.
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2.3. The Nucleolus Solution
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that assigns a unique
distribution  of  the  overall  surplus  generated  by  the  coalition.  The  nucleolus  solution  is  based  on
quantifying  the  happiness of  the  coalition  C’  in  relation to a  predefined allocation within a  larger
coalition C. This can be expressed as the difference between how much the nodes of  the coalition C’ are
earning in the larger coalition  C and how much they would be earning by breaking away the large
coalition and collaborating among themselves, i.e.,
h(C’, C ) = Σi  C’ x(i, C ) – v(C’ ).
Note that if  h(C’,C) is high, the coalition C’ will not have a strong incentive for breaking away from the
larger coalition C. From this point, the nucleolus solution aims to maximize the happiness of  the most
unhappy coalition. Hence, it can stated as,
max (min{h(C’, C )}).
In this sense, the nucleolus solution takes into consideration the bargaining power of  the different supply
chain members (Saad, Han, Debbah, Hjorungnes & Basar, 2009). That is, the larger the net profit of  a
node i, the stronger its bargaining power in the different coalitions where this node participates. Similarly,
the larger the net profit of  a specific coalition  C’, the stronger its bargaining power of  the net profit
generated by a larger coalition C.
Some years ago, Nagarajan and Sošić (2008) highlighted that “despite its nice properties, the nucleolus is
yet to find its application in the supply chain management literature”. They only found two papers that
applied this concept to the supply chain (Hartman & Dror, 1996; Leng & Parlar, 2009), which showed
that this solution could be a useful mechanism to allocate the cost savings derived from cooperation.
Other recent works in this same scenario should be highlighted, such as Lozano, Moreno, Adenso-Díaz
and  Algaba  (2013).  The  main  difference  of  our  approach  lies  in  the  fact  that  we  focus  on  profit
distribution as a more robust mechanism for the alignment of  incentives throughout the supply chain. 
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3. A Numerical Example Based on the Beer Game Supply Chain
The  Beer  Game  role-playing  exercise,  which  aims  to  teach  the  main  principles  of  supply  chain
management,  has  been  used  in  countless  management  courses  since  it  was  developed  at  the  MIT
(Jarmain, 1963). Its scenario is defined by a single-product serial supply chain, composed of  four main
actors: factory, distributor, wholesaler, and retailer (e.g. Ponte, Pino & de la Fuente, 2014). This simple
supply chain has proven to be very effective in helping practitioners and researchers to understand the
causal  relationships  between  decision-making  and  supply  chain  performance  (Goodwin  & Franklin,
1994). For this reason, the Beer Game scenario, which is schematically shown in Figure 2, has been widely
studied in the literature. We will employ it to illustrate the framework proposed for profit allocation in the
supply chain.
Thus, we have a supply chain with n = 4 echelons. In this section, we will use the following notation:
i = 1 for the factory; i = 2 for the distributor; i = 3 for the wholesaler; and i = 4 for the retailer.
Figure 2. Overview of  the Beer Game supply chain, standing out the two main flows
3.1. Assumptions
The Beer Game scenario dramatically amplifies the variability of  the orders and inventories as they move
up the supply chain;  see e.g.  Sterman (1989).  This  phenomenon, the so-called Bullwhip Effect,  is  a
harmful  source  of  inefficiencies  within  the  supply  chain,  which  significantly  decreases  the  overall
performance (Wang & Disney, 2016). By way of  example, we assume that the supply chain net profit is
$1,000  under  a  non-collaborative  approach;  i.e.,  v(1) +  v(2) +  v(3) +  v(4) = $1,000.  As  previously
mentioned, the Bullwhip Effect specially damages the upper echelons, so we will consider the following
profits: v(4) = $400 for the retailer, v(3) = $300 for the wholesaler, v(2) = $200 for the distributor, and v(1)
= $100 for the factory.
The Beer Game also illustrates that the overall performance of  the system –both in operational and in
economic terms– dramatically improves when collaborative practices are introduced in the system; see e.g.
Costas, Ponte, de la Fuente, Pino and Puche (2015). For example, we will assume that the supply chain net
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profit is $1,500 under a fully collaborative approach; v(N) = v(1234) = $1,500. Under this approach aimed
at local optimization, the key question is how the decision makers should allocate the surplus generated by
collaboration among the four nodes. 
We will also need as baseline information the impact evaluation of  the various nodes breaking away from
the collaboration. Since the retailer observes the customer demand (hence sharing information would be
incomplete without it), we will assume this is a key node within the collaborative framework. For this
reason, we consider for example that if  this echelon does not involve in collaboration, the supply chain
would only make $1,200; i.e. v(123) + v(4) = $1,200. Similarly, the factory elaborates the product, so its
participation in the collaborative process is also essential. Hence, let’s assume that, if  this node breaks
away, the system would make $1,400; i.e., v(234) + v({4}) = $1,150. In a similar vein, we have considered
that if  the wholesaler leaves the collaborative solution, it will significantly impact on the supply chain
since this node manages the distribution flow. We consider that the profit would also be $1,400 in this
case;  v(124) + v(3)  = $1,150. On the contrary, the supply chain net profit has been assumed to be less
sensitive to the participation of  the distributor: the system would make $1,400 if  this node does not
involve in collaboration; i.e., v(134) + v(2) = $1,450.
Note that from the previous information, we could easily calculate the net profit obtained from the four
possible 3-node coalitions in the supply chain. This information is shown in Table 1, together with the
different results obtained in the 2-node coalitions. These net profits, which are also starting information
of  this problem, have been set taking into consideration the previously explained notion of  the weights
of  the different nodes. 
No coalitions 2-node coalitions 3-node coalitions 4-node coalitions
v(1) = 100 v(12) = 400 v(123) = 800 v(1234) = 1,500
v(2) = 200 v(13) = 450 v(124) = 850
v(3) = 300 v(14) = 600 v(134) = 1,250
v(4) = 400 v(23) = 550 v(234) = 1,050
v(24) = 650
v(34) = 750
Table 1. Net profit for the different possible coalitions in the supply chain
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3.2. Classical Mechanisms for Net Profit Allocation
Before analyzing the proposed game-theoretical solutions, we will analyze two traditional alternatives. In
the  first  one,  we  will  consider  an  equitable  distribution  of  the  overall  surplus  generated  by  the
collaboration (Method 1), which is
Surplus = v(1234) – [v(1) + v(2) + v(3) + v(4)] = $500. 
Under this distribution criteria, the solution to the allocation problem would imply an increase of  each
node’s profit in the non-collaborative context by $500 / 4 = $125. Hence, we would have that x(i, N) =
v(i ) + $125, that is:
x(1, N) = $225
x(2, N) = $325
x(3, N) = $425
x(4, N) = $525
Another basic solution, although more advanced than the previous one, would be to take into account
the differences between the supply chain nodes, and consequently to consider how much each node
was earning in the non-collaborative context. From this point, the surplus is distributed proportionally
(Method 2). Therefore, x(i, N) = v(i ) + Surplus ∙ ki, where ki = v(i ) / Σa = {1,2,3,4} v(a). This situation would
lead to the following distribution:
x(1, N) = $150
x(2, N) = $300
x(3, N) = $450
x(4, N) = $600
Note that while the first method makes equal the increase in absolute terms of  the net profit of  the
different supply chain nodes ($125), the second method makes equal the increase in relative terms (50%). 
At a first glance, these solutions could seem acceptable. In fact, a discussion with several groups of
students revealed that the proportional distribution of  the surplus was understood as the most intuitive
solution  to  the  allocation  problem.  Nonetheless,  a  reminder  of  the  previously  defined  concept  of
happiness for each possible coalition, made come to surface its significant drawbacks.
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h(C, N) Method 1 Method 2
h(1, N) 125 50
h(2, N) 125 100
h(3, N) 125 150
h(4, N) 125 200
h(12, N) 150 50
h(13, N) 200 150
h(14, N) 150 150
h(23, N) 200 200
h(24, N) 200 250
h(34, N) 200 300
h(123, N) 175 100
h(124, N) 225 200
h(134, N) -75 -50
h(234, N) 225 300
Table 2. Happiness of  each possible coalition in Methods 1 and 2
Table 2 shows that not only the happiness of  the different coalitions will vary significantly, but also that a
specific coalition, the one formed by nodes 1, 3, and 4 (factory, wholesaler, and retailer) will fell unhappy
with both scenarios. Note that the sum of  the net profit of  nodes 1, 3, and 4 would be $1,175 when using
Method 1 and $1,200 with Method 2, while v(134) = $1,250. This means that coalition rationality does
not apply: these three nodes will not be interested in node 2 (distributor) joining to the collaborative
process since their allocation suffers as a result of  the node 2 presence in the coalition. Seeing from
another perspective, this supply chain member is capturing more profit than what he/she contributes to
the collaborative supply chain with.
3.3. The Nucleolus Solution for Distributing the Net Profit
The  nucleolus  solution  implies  analyzing  the  allocation  issue  as  an  optimization  problem aimed  at
maximizing  the  happiness  of  the  most  unhappy  coalition  (Method  3).  The  only  constraint  to  be
considered is that the sum of  the individual net profits must equal the overall net profit of  the system
($1,500), i.e., the efficiency property. From this optimization problem applied to the previously defined
scenario, we obtain the following solutions:
x(1, N) = $225
x(2, N) = $225
x(3, N) = $410.5
x(4, N) = $639.5
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Table 3 shows the happiness of  the four nodes operating individually (h(i, N)) in the first four rows. Since
all  these  values  are  positive,  it  means  that  individual  rationality  apply.  That  is  to  say,  they  gain  by
participating in the collaborative  solution.  From this  point  on,  Table  3 shows the happiness of  the
possible coalitions in the system (except obviously the fully collaborative solution) in the last ten rows.
These values are also positive. Hence, unlike Methods 1 and 2, coalition rationality does apply, and there is
not any coalition in the system that would be interested in breaking away from the overall collaborative
supply chain. However, note that we have highlighted (in bold) the minimum happiness in the system,
which corresponds to node 2 (distributor) and to the coalition formed by nodes 1, 3, and 4.
h(C, N) Nucleolus solution
h(1, N) 125
h(2, N) 25
h(3, N) 110.5
h(4, N) 239.5
h(12, N) 50
h(13, N) 185.5
h(14, N) 264.5
h(23, N) 85.5
h(24, N) 214.5
h(34, N) 300
h(123, N) 60.5
h(124, N) 239.5
h(134, N) 25
h(234, N) 225
Table 3. Happiness of  each possible coalition in the nucleolus solution (Method 3)
Figure 3 displays the allocation for the three solutions. In a similar vein, Table 4 compares the three
allocation methods that we have analyzed in terms of: (a) the absolute increase of  the nodes’ net profit;
(b) the relative increase of  the nodes’ net profit; and (c) the percentage each node gathers from the
surplus generated by collaboration.
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Figure 3. The nucleolus solution versus traditional methods for profit allocation
Method Node Net profit Δ abs Δ rel ki
Method 1
Factory 225 125 125.00% 25.00%
Distributor 325 125 62.50% 25.00%
Wholesaler 425 125 41.67% 25.00%
Retailer 525 125 31.25% 25.00%
Method 2
Factory 150 50 50.00% 10.00%
Distributor 300 100 50.00% 20.00%
Wholesaler 450 150 50.00% 30.00%
Retailer 600 200 50.00% 40.00%
Nucleolus
Factory 225 125 125.00% 25.00%
Distributor 225 25 12.50% 5.00%
Wholesaler 410.5 110.5 36.84% 22.10%
Retailer 639.5 239.5 59.87% 47.90%
Table 4. Net profit increase in absolute (Δabs) and relative (Δrel) terms for the various allocation methods, as well as the
percentage (ki) each node gathers from the surplus. 
While Methods 1 and 2 would not be acceptable for some nodes as we have seen before, the nucleolus
solution –derived from applying this game-theoretic concept– offers a powerful framework from which
to approach this problem. It should be underlined that the nucleolus solution is based on taking into
consideration the bargaining power of  the different nodes. For this reason, the distributor will gather only
a small part of  the surplus generated by collaboration (5%) –he/she was capturing 25% of  the surplus in
Method 1 and 20% in Method 2, which was not right for the other nodes whose contribution to the
collaborative  solution is  much more significant.  Hence,  the  distributor  will  be  forced to accept  this
situation. In this sense, the supply chain actors who benefit the most from the nucleolus solution are
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those whose presence in the collaborative solution is  essential –namely,  the factory and the retailer–
according to the scenario that has been previously defined. 
4. Conclusions
Supply chain collaboration can be interpreted as two or more firms working together to achieve higher
profits than those that can be obtained by acting alone (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2002). Within the
collaborative scheme aimed at optimizing the system in its entirety, information sharing and decision
synchronization must be understood as enablers, while the competitive advantages are built on process
integration. 
These  features  are  necessary,  but  not  sufficient:  incentive  alignment  also  plays  a  key  role.  The
collaborative solution would not be viable if  some of  the supply chain members had incentives to break
away. In this sense, game theory provides managers with a powerful approach to this problem. We define
three conditions as essential to ensure the viability of  a profit allocation: efficiency, individual rationality
and coalition rationality. From this point on, a solution for the profit allocation problem based on the
concept of  nucleolus has been developed. It allows us to design a robust mechanism for the distribution
of  the surplus generated by collaboration, which takes into account the bargaining power of  the different
nodes.  This solution is  aimed at maximizing the minimum happiness of  the possible coalitions and
consequently at ensuring the stability and sustainability of  long term coalitions. 
Please note that an underlying assumption of  this game-theoretical approach is that the net profit of  each
node would be the same if  the node does not cooperate, regardless of  how the other supply chain
members behave. This condition would not apply in some real-world supply chain scenarios, where the
different nodes are seriously impacted by the decisions of  their partners. Under these circumstances, we
plan the development of  a mechanism that takes this fact into consideration as a potential and interesting
next step.
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